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Introduction
In his Rules of Sociological Method, Emile Durkheim as one of the most 
influential sociologists and proponents of the idea of ‘society’ and inadvertently 
‘culture’ as the appropriate analytical focus defines a ‘social fact’ fact as
‘a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they consist of 
manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, which are 
invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him’ 
(1982:52).
This statement carries a particular ontological claim which has underpinned 
much comparative thinking and still is the premise for much so-called critical 
analysis.  The claim is the following: society is an objectively real entity that 
exists independently and autonomously of its particular individual members. 
Such an entity manifests itself in ‘social facts’. These social facts, as real objects 
themselves, shape individual behaviours. Furthermore, social facts exist 
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externally not only to the members of a society but also to the researcher’s mind. 
Attributing such an ontological claim to the existence of ‘real’ objects direct in 
return specific epistemological and methodological questions based upon a 
belief in a dualism between self and society as two separate phenomena. 
The impact of Durkheim was to insist that social facts can become known and be 
studied scientifically through the effects they produce, that is through observing 
their impact on a society’s members. His method thus relied on the rationalist 
idea of the observer who can supposedly discern cause and effect relationships 
that determine human behaviour. This positivist premise means ‘cause’ reads 
society and ‘effect’ reads individual behaviour. ‘Social facts’ are what mediate this 
relationship as they index this causality, and in general, are determined by their 
ability to coerce behaviour. In the Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim 
delineated two different classes of social facts. The first class included a society’s 
legal code, its religious beliefs, concepts of beauty, monetary system, ways of 
dressing, its language. In all these cases, it is easy to see how society imposes 
itself on to its members from the outside. The second class referred to 
demographic and material conditions of life. Both classes shaped collective ways 
of thinking, acting, and feeling for they have the same characteristics of 
externality and constraining power. 
Durkheim’s other analytic component was ‘collective representations’ 
(représentations collectives). The French term représentation is slightly different 
from its English equivalent of representation as it means both a copy of 
something and an idea about something. Collective representations are the 
social facts Durkheim is mostly interested in. They are meant to comprise 
fundamental categories of thought through which all members of society 
perceive reality and navigate themselves within. Accordingly, concepts of time, 
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space, causality, personality, numbering and so forth will vary across cultures 
and societies exactly because each society forms its own representations of 
them. Durkheim argued that such representations have their origin in society, 
not in the individual, and in this sense, are impersonal, invariable and stable. 
They will endure the death of individual members for they are fixed and difficult 
to change. 
Collective representations correspond to Durkheim’s specific term for social facts 
as these relate to concerns regarding knowledge and language. Through 
language society is able to pass on to an individual a whole body of collective 
knowledge that greatly exceeds the limits of individual experience. The way 
individuals experience and perceive and the knowledge they come to have is 
highly informed by the language they speak. For Durkheim, language is a 
privileged repository of collective representations in the forms of words. 
However collective representations are not limited to words but encompass the 
whole range of human experience. In general, Durkheim argued that the world 
exists and the reality is comprehended only as far it is represented; all of our 
knowledge of the world is necessarily grounded in our representations of it. 
Such representations are collective, by which he meant they depend on and are 
affected by society. In being represented by society, the world is infused by 
elements which are of social rather than individual origin. Access to the world 
and reality is thus mediated by collective categories; such collective categories 
provide individual lives with meaning and value.
In the end, Durkheim’s thinking had an enduring impact in setting up the idea of 
‘Society’, with a capital S, as the transcendent principle or object par excellence. 
Everything comes from Society and returns to Society. Society creates for itself 
through collective representations a vast network of conscious and unconscious 
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categories that is instrumental in allowing society to reproduce itself. Individuals 
understand and think of the world in terms of socially derived categories. 
Individuals are transient; society is eternal. Moreover, society has a creative 
power for it establishes, from the outset, the limits of possibility of rationalist, 
linguistic expression and knowledge in general. 
Why I spent time bringing up Durkheim at the beginning of this essay is 
because of his analytical categories of social facts and collective representation 
and the overarching idea of Society (and Culture) that has remained as an 
underlying ‘academic common sense’ despite widespread critique of his 
conceptual premise. I shall discuss some of the early critique of Durkheim’s 
deterministic, ahistorical and over-generalised account of ‘culture’ and ‘society’ 
through a review of one of the most influential functionalist account of ‘culture’ 
as cause and ‘human behaviour as ‘effect’. I do so to remind us of the complexity 
of comparing social phenomena and to highlight that the choice of conceptual 
framework is always a political act. 
Academic failure as potent history maker
Ruth Benedict’s much acclaimed book on Japan The Chrysanthemum and the 
Sword (1946), or Kiku （菊） to Katana（刀）in Japanese (1948) sets out to 
present the chrysanthemum as the most chilling aspect of Japanese culture. The 
sword was not an image of aggression, rather it presented to her an ideal of a 
self-responsible man who is aware of his honour and depth of obligation. The 
chrysanthemum on the other hand was illustrative of everything that was 
horrifying to her about ‘Japanese culture’. Japanese gardens were places where 
nature itself was forced to fit particular patterns of culture. Chrysanthemums, 
grown in pots and shown in flower shows with each perfect petal separated by 
invisible wires, indicated to Benedict the horror of the patterns of culture (‘the 
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stench of atrophied personality’) where the majority are lost and astray unless 
the tune has been set for them, their personalities touched from the outside (see 
Lummis 2007). 
Many have argued over the past 25 years in Japanese studies how Ruth 
Benedict’s famous book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword makes the 
ideology of a class representative of Japanese culture (e.g. Robertson 2005). 
However, the issue here is not simply about revealing a false cultural account. 
Studying culture and the issue of comparison as if a ‘real’ reality was waiting to 
be revealed in light of uncovering the ‘false’ one fails to engage with the 
unfolding of history and what the effect of such a cultural construction on the 
historical process itself is, in the case of Benedict’s work becoming a very 
influential part of Japanese national identity construction. Academic knowledge 
is here itself intertwined with creating history rather than simply being a 
reflection of it. This means that Benedict’s cultural profile, however simplified 
and ‘false’ we may see it, intersect as postwar Japanese cultural production that 
makes it impossible to ignore or simply dismiss as false. While Benedict herself 
recognisesded the construction of the Emperor-centred Japanese state ideology 
in the book, her representation of a homogenous state at a point of acute social 
dislocation that is then taken to be the normal cultural condition for a whole 
society presents prominent effects on postwar Japan. 
As an extraordinary moment in the nation’s history becomes represented as 
homogenous Japanese ‘culture’, a model for unchanging norm of social behaviour 
enforces the idea of ‘Society’ as a cultural structure without specific actors and 
groups of people. This ‘Japanese’ culture in the postwarera can also be 
conveniently used to construct an image of ‘Japan’ as saved only by Americans 
who bring democracy to Japan. Setting up here the past and the present as 
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separate phenomena as if they do not intercept with each other equally 
constructs the past as a point of universal Japanese shame and stays in the 
national consciousness as the ‘bad’ thing that happened in the past (see 
Hashimoto 2015) without actually understanding much of the historical 
complexities involved. Yet, reading the Chrysanthemum and the Sword we do 
not exactly come to dislike the Japanese. In fact, at the end of the book, we do 
not feel one culture is necessarily the superior ‘civilization’ to the other. Instead 
both American and Japanese cultural profiles are one of exoticism and 
transcendence of individual difference into a functionalist whole and ideal type.
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was translated into Japanese in 1948, at a 
time of intense national self-examination. In light of Japan’s loss in the war and 
American occupation in the immediate years after the war, Japanese intellectuals 
and writers studied the sources and meaning of Japanese history and character, 
and a whole range of Japanese popular commentators, writers and academics 
took it upon themselves to write about what it means to be ‘Japanese’. This 
constructed a new national imagination and a genre that becomes known as 
Nihonjinron – or theories of Japanese-ness, which not only added, but was part 
of creating a growing ethnic and cultural nationalism that discussed Japanese 
culture by juxtaposing it against ‘Western culture’ (usually read American 
culture) (see Befu 2001). Japanese cultural critics were especially interested in 
Benedict’s attempt to portray the total structure of Japanese culture, and their 
accounts of Japanese uniqueness that was to animate so much post-war Japanese 
identity. These dominant discourses typically left out the effects of historical 
transformation, and themselves constructed political ideologies that have been 
seen to shape particular forms for individual and collective behaviour in the 
name of “natural” Japanese-ness. This essentialised Japanese uniqueness 
mirrored other essentialised entities such as the ‘West’, or more specifically 
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‘America’. 
Today Benedict’s book highlights this complicated relationship between history 
and anthropology and more widely between history and academia. Her, failure to 
engage with a more nuanced and direct historical account, with issues of social 
change, and with what was effectively the well-trodden path of colonialism 
seeking markets and resources constructed ‘culture’ as the easy to understand 
from of explanation. To have a more specific understanding of ‘culture’ and 
‘society’ we would need to think about anchoring the “social carriers” whereby 
actual society and culture are created and carried on - through whom and how, 
and for what reason. ‘Social carriers’ (soziale traeger) was a focus of Max Weber 
well before Benedict’s time  who by contrast to Durkheim did not regard the 
existence of societies as holistic objects but instead focused on the centrality of 
societal domains with specific social actors. This immediately distinguished his 
sociology from structural-functionalism, which became so influential but also 
seriously problematic. The pivotal aspect of Weber’s sociology was his focus on 
‘social carriers’ . In the Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism he 
showed how ascetic Protestant Churches and Sects “carried” patterns of social 
action oriented to values in particular ways into everyday life. He took the 
individual’s pattern of social action as the basic unit of his sociology, while the 
question within what carrier status group or organisation social action occurs 
remained fundamental to all his studies (Kahlberg 2002). Thus a strong focus 
on history remained combined with a sociological analysis. Weber contested 
Sombert’s view that the development of economic rationalism can be explained 
away by reference to a general all-encompassing, and evolutionary growth of 
‘rationalism’ which is also why he presents no easy acceptance of rationalism as 
a monolithic category. In the Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism 
he opposed both economic determinism and the organicist view of society. 
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Instead, he investigated religion not as a social fact but as a societal domain. The 
emphasis on the role of “social carriers” – showed how institutional practice and 
people ‘carried’ patterned social action oriented to interest, values, efficiency, a 
cultural objectification of morality that became a new historically situated form of 
rationality that exactly because of its everyday situatedness and embodiment 
became powerful drives for trying to achieve economic success. In his work, we 
see a lucid understanding of the centrality of history to sociological work.
‘Culture’ as meaningful patterned behaviour, individual attitudes, and historical 
memory 
Had ‘culture’ as objectified social phenomena of actual patterned behaviour been 
taken more seriously at the level of a more open-ended interaction, it would 
likely have taken into account, as I discuss in the next section some indeed did, a 
level of analysis beyond the functionalist paradigm of which Benedict’s work is 
such a prime example. With an aim of getting to more in-depth historical 
questions about the extent to which people in Japan were really so un-ambivalent 
in their support for the state as they were represented, and a focus on who more 
specifically were the people and groups “carrying” the state ideology to made 
this rationale hegemonic would have greatly added to the cultural explanation. 
This may have led to understanding how the generalised picture of pre-war 
totalitarianism was part of a postwar reconstruct of the ‘lucky’ defeat and 
‘welcomed’ occupation narrative. The narrative of the ‘good defeat’ became part 
of constructing a taboo against engaging with a more complex understanding of 
that history, a taboo that works in complicated ways today to intercept in public 
discourse and the use of historical memory to construct the intention of one’s 
political opponent (Fisker-Nielsen forthcoming). The taboo of publicly 
discussing the complex historical forces as acted out by particular groups that 
may indeed have come in the force of ‘social facts’ (just not in exactly the way 
Comparing Cultures and Societies : the anthropological quest to understand the diversity and the universals of life （ 47 ）
imagined by Durkheim) tell us much about the continuous ideological 
interpretations that dominate the ambiguity of memory and the way history can 
always be brought out as a political card in the present. 
The narrative of implied necessity of a total break with the past shuts down 
avenues for dialogue about the nuances in the totalising picture of ‘the Japanese’, 
as if all behaved the same way in what becomes simply the ‘bad war’ in popular 
memory. This totalising picture plays out powerfully in geo-politics today while 
our attention remains distracted from the major role civil society groups 
(institutionalised social carriers) played such as the mass media, neighbourhood 
groups, women’s associations, state recognised Buddhist and Shinto institutions 
etc. that were part of a much more diffused notion of power. More widely, there 
is little focus on how middle- and working-class narratives of support for the war 
made this historical turn possible (Yamazaki 1991), or the groups that also 
worked against this militarising logic of colonialism. The lack of focus on 
specifics in return allows for inadvertent forms to emerge of Japanese society as 
a past totalitarian regime that was somehow simply sprung upon by  a 
homogenous group of coercive state forces rather than investigating the battles 
against this also by some how so many became complicit and active in the 
making of a war nation. The imagined totalitarianism over a more detailed and 
complex history suits those who want to dictate the future as one that breaks 
with the past in its totality so the homogenous ethnic nation can be constituted 
as needing to be kept in check from a return to its past militarism. Needless to 
say, Japan hardly constitutes just one homogenous group of people. This logic, 
however, continues to construct geo-political issues today as if the primary 
issues were about the moral legitimacy of the “pacifist nation” (can state and 
military forces be trusted to command the armed forces again?) rather than a 
less emotional and more substantially informed debate about how to respond to 
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today’s concerns which cannot simply be ignored. The totalising narrative of a 
defeated nation still works in unexpected ways today by which ideological 
accounts of the “Japanese” as a homogenous group of either totally bad or totally 
good past endeavours resonate. 
Thus, instead of understanding the links between values and beliefs in orienting 
different kinds of actions for different groups of people, as well as focusing on 
who were the ‘social carriers’ that made such unavoidable ‘common sense’ the 
dominant societal rationale of the day, the postwar narrative becomes the 
template for engagement with a simplified representation of a past ‘Japanese 
militarist culture’ that by this nature can always be brought back again and again 
as a counterpoint to make a political argument in the present. In today’ s public 
discourse on security issues, we can observe how historical memory is being 
used to interpret the present while simultaneously little reference is being made 
to a more complex understanding of that history and the impact of an extremely 
fragmented public opinion of the 1930s that was part of creating a political 
vacuum and facilitated the dominancy of the military (Banno 2012).
One of the biggest problems today however is the unwillingness to deal with the 
complexity of reality. The politics of memory is an intensifying force in East Asia, 
often as a struggle to Self-identity against that of the Other whom blame can be 
directed and a superior position in moral judgement taken. This is both visible 
on the left and the right political spectrum. The ambiguity in memory suggests a 
paradoxical arbitrariness in the process of articulating memory in the present 
time. Japan, China, and South Korea have long been at odds over how to 
interpret Japan’s militaristic empire building and the warfare that resulted and 
ended with defeat in August 1945. Over the past two decades, nationalist 
sentiments in the three countries have grown, but as suggested by Anthony 
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Rausch (2014), journalistic institutions have not simply reflected this but actively 
contributed to the political use of memory. Invoking national representations of 
the past becomes media spectacles and make the stories more resonant 
(Edelman 1988). Elsaesser (1985: 40) proposes that ‘the act of representation 
makes history the phantom signifier of endlessly interchangeable referents’. 
Memories are highly malleable and as Halbwachs argued, ‘depending on its 
circumstances and points in time, society represents the past to itself in different 
ways: it modifies its conventions’ (1992: 172-73). Ambiguity inherent in memory 
signifies the changeability of interpretation and that the process of remembering 
is intrinsically political, a lived history with a strong bias toward the present 
(Kansteiner, 2002). 
Challenging the notion of ‘society’ read ‘culture’ was always present 
The extremely eloquent and captivating book that Benedict produces goes on to 
become one of the most popular of all anthropological books ever and ‘culture’ 
becomes the locus of analysis in postwar Japan for a long time. The analytical 
mistake of presenting an ahistorical, timeless and de-contextualized picture of a 
supposedly homogenous group of people dictated by their cultural mores was a 
framework already challenged decades earlier by her American colleagues from 
the Chicago School of Sociology. They found that social groups (albeit as 
immigrants) had the ability to reconstruct themselves (not totally different from 
the new religious groups in Japan at the time). The Chicago School argued 
against the widely taken for granted premise that ‘society’ could be taken as a 
totalising determining structure. 
For instance, prominent figures of this new empirical focus were W.I. Thomas 
(1863-1947) who collaborated on a study of the Polish Diaspora with the Pole 
Florian Znaniecki (1882-1959). They observed and interviewed thousands of 
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Polish immigrants flooding into America. Thomas and Znaniecki used an 
ethnographic method and collected personal letters from Polish immigrants to 
study what was then becoming an ethnic underclass in Chicago. Sociologists in 
American at this time were doing participant observation otherwise so famously 
claimed by Bronislow Malinowski as his invention. Thomas and Znaniecki study 
came to a 2000 page-long book called The Polish Peasant in Europe and 
America (1918-1920). This ground-breaking book fulfilled every possible 
expectation about empirical research undertaken among immigrants both in 
Poland, on their way to America, and once they settled in America. What is 
notable for us here is that they critically engaged with Durkheim’s formula for 
social inquiry set out in his Rules of Sociological Methods that spelled out the 
merits of a functionalist model of analysis, the kind of analytical basis for 
Benedict’s conclusions. Durkheim had argued that social phenomena must be 
sought, not at an individual level, but exclusively as social phenomena, a social 
fact. This was much more in line with Benedict’ s analysis, notwithstanding her 
inability to undertake first-hand research and the pressure to produce a coherent 
picture for the American war department. 
Thomas and Znaniecki had pointed out early on the limitations of Durkheim’s 
‘social facts’ explanations as these were representions of general ideal values 
rather than ‘facts’ about peoples’ lives or accurately reflecting their experiences. 
Thus, foreshadowing the later 1980s crises in representation, they argued that 
general values cannot be taken to constitute the whole picture of reality but only 
be a referent to general representations. Thomas and Znaniecki reasoned 
instead that predominant value-frameworks had to be analysed in light of people’s 
attitudes towards them to understand how such general values affect and differ 
from people’s lives. The failure of Durkheim’ s project for them was that his 
sociology did not include attitudes towards these general values. Thomas and 
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Znaniecki stressed that the ‘succession of values alone [a generalised idea about 
things] cannot constitute a fact’ (Vol 2:1832-33). Thus, a more in depth 
understanding of what we today may refer to as ‘sociality’ were part of the 
developing ideas of the Chicago School of Sociology in the early twenty century, 
their aim being to understand not only actual interception of self and society, but 
rather how the very creation of ‘self’ and ‘society’ cannot be understood as a 
priori separate objects or binary phenomena. Stressing the individual actor’s 
‘definition of the situation’, which was in fact influenced by Benedict’s own 
teacher Franz Boas, they took steps to build an empirical sociology of race and 
ethnic relations that entirely rejected any elements of biological reductionism, or 
understanding through abstract views of generalised values as representative of 
people’s reality (see Stock 1989). However, from the 1940s and afterwards, as 
Japanese and American scholars debated so-called ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ cultures 
derived from Benedict’s thesis, it was those concepts that became part of 
everyday parlance and common-sense logics as ways to understand “Japanese 
culture” , ideas that proliferated as part of self-understanding and representation of 
a post-war Japanese national identity (Lumnis 2007). 
As argued by Clifford Geertz, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword is as much 
about the USA as it is about Japan. The ethnocentric picture of America is 
equally a generalised ideal value framework of a people who demonstrate 
steadfast and internalised principles by which they lead their lives. The book 
sold millions of copies in America and was part of constructing imaginings about 
its postwar national identity as the bringer of democracy to the world. The ideal 
cultural profiles of both Japan and America also established the cultural 
paradigm for post-war US-Japan relations. This paradigm painted Japan as the 
most suitable country for the USA to have defeated and occupied. It helped to 
enlarge a US national identity as the bringer of democracy and engaged civil 
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society portrayed as unknown qualities in Japan before the defeat. Defeat of 
Japan thus come to be constructed as the perfect remedy to its inability to 
otherwise progress to become a modern, democratic nation-state. Japan’s The 
totalising representation of militarism explained as purely a cultural problem 
presents the idea of a culture that had no principles of freedom and 
egalitarianism, individual choice and democratic thinking on its own but had to 
be brought to Japan by a foreign culture. American occupation was thus 
constructed as a good thing to have happened to Japan, a defeat that Japan 
should be grateful for, and importantly provided with a new Constitution based 
on democratic and pacifist principles that the Japanese could not possibly have 
made up by themselves. While this narrative is not a completely false one, it is 
also extremely simplified that presents Japan as a past totalitarian regime, which 
Japan was not. 
Japan’s own ‘social carriers’
In 1946, Benedict proposed that Japanese culture contained no concept of the 
spirit of freedom, no principle of liberation, no internal resistance to the military 
take-over. The prominent role the mass media played in drumming up support 
for war for instance were simply not considered with any historical details. Thus, 
one of the most significant civil societies and social carriers - the press – which 
had been in place almost immediately after the Meiji restoration of 1868, and 
long before the draconian restrictions employed by the military in the late 1930s 
and early 40s was not discussed. The mass media had argued for an 
unrestrained military, and at times goaded the nation to military adventurism as 
argued by Masakazu Yamazaki (1991). Highbrow newspapers with limited 
circulation were absorbed by the burgeoning popular papers. These mass 
organs catered to the numerically overwhelming coalition between the middle-
class and grassroots readership who were seen as susceptible and prone to 
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sensationalism and nationalism. Development of middle-class intellectuals – 
interi – and their contempt for university professors and their ivory tower 
intellectual endeavours and complicated explanations, the press often appealed 
to readers’ contradictory desires to see government attacked and praised 
patriotism by promoting in favour of a hawkish foreign policy (ibid.). The line of 
intellectually progressive journalists was unable to stop the popular press. For 
instance, in the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Asahi against it 
arch-rival the Mainichi set on an unprecedented newsgathering spree and 
competed to whip up the war spirit in the public sphere (ibid.).
Thus, public rhetoric was highly emotionally charged and dominated by a press 
with ideological simplification, and as Yamazaki argues, seems to have presented 
an irresistible appeal to the popular psyche (ibid.), and certainly created a public 
common sense of support for the war efforts. Such complicated reality, and how 
the middle-class interi (intellectuals) could come to identify with the grassroots 
in their anti-Americanism became the ‘common sense’ for a solidarity rooted in 
mutual contempt for the academic class in their emphasis on history and details 
of events. Thus, it is clear that there was a shift in the nature of debates that 
steered people’s support for the war and military take-over of Japan’s political 
leaders.
Benedict includes few such actual historical facts (of which many more could be 
pointed out and only a snippet given here) but instead history was replaced by 
cultural explanations of a people simply seeking to look good to others, 
concerned utmost with whether their honour or whether they would be socially 
shamed. Rather than any reference to an actual history of why Japan fought the 
war, convenient cultural explanation left out reference to the logics of colonial 
powers, imperial expansion, seeking markets, resources, investment outlets, 
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cheap labour, and the general track of a colonial history (Lumnis 2007). In her 
comparative cultural profile, Benedict seemed determined to show how 
completely different Japan was. As she had done in her previous studies 
contrasting plains and pueblo “Indians” according to their Dionysian versus 
Apollonian characteristics, Ruth Benedict comparative framework set up ideal 
types of culture that took on their own personality. With a supposedly singular 
dominant cultural drive we get a morally consistent pattern that stands as a neat 
idealist account rather than a historical account of the complexity of multiple 
actors and political forces carried out at many levels of society. 
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword thus tells its readers that Japanese culture 
constructed as Japanese militarism must be changed and indirectly that this can 
only be done under the force of the US military occupation. As she turns the 
internally admired samurai code into the whole of Japanese culture Japan itself 
becomes a cult of Bushido. ‘Shame culture’ whereby one’s honour is shamed 
versus a ‘guilt culture’ where violating one’s own conscience through internalised 
convictions of sin come to resonate cross-culturally as a comparative framework 
by which both the Japanese and the Americans can be understood and 
explained. In the case of Japan, ‘shame culture’ has a central value system that 
comprises a hierarchically ordered series of notions of obligation such as on, 
chu, ko, gimu. These ideas were taken from the pre-1945 moral education 
(shushin kyōiku) textbooks issued by the Ministry of Education. It indeed was 
the text by which Japanese state ideology was disseminated. Yet, it is quite 
another thing to take that as representative of the reality of Japanese people’s 
beliefs. This makes the major mistake of conflating state ideology with reality of 
all people’ s lives. The distinction between shame and guilt as method for social 
control leave those guided by a ‘guilt culture’ and by supposedly internalised 
principles in the superior realm of guiding others to the ideals if civilized 
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democracy that was not supposedly possible by Japanese people’s own account. 
This dualistic analysis leaves out a rich history of actors that indeed did strive for 
democratic governance in the past in Japan, as well as the history of all those 
that strove against democracy in America. 
We know today how this cultural profile become part of a whole new postwar 
historical production of national identity, used to construct numerous theories 
about the Japanese as a supposedly homogenous groups of people. These 
theories of Japanese-ness, the so-called Nihonjinron genre represent 
characterisitcs of ‘collectivism’, ‘groupism’, the seeking of ‘harmony’ and 
adherence to a hierarchically ordered social world that is Japanese culture. 
Concepts of amae (Doi Takeo) and Tateshakai (Nakano Chie) come to ring true 
for postwar Japan as central structural-functionalist social institutions. On the 
other hand, we may protest and say well Benedict’s text is not untrue as we can 
clearly see a propensity for adherence to social hierarchy, a cultural logic of 
reverence for status superior as modes of interaction. Yet, it is precisely the 
timeless, essentialist, ahistorical and simplified picture of these “Japanese” 
characteristics that conflate valorised ideal types with a complex and diverse 
reality that becomes problematic. The Japanese social critic Tamotsu Aoki 
(1990) has suggested that The Chrysanthemum and the Sword helped to 
invent a new tradition for postwar Japan, a book that was translated at a time of 
intense national self-examination and just as popular in Japan as in the US. The 
influence here of Durkheim with a focus on dominant values but without 
contesting them as ideological and obscure the of the political nature of such a 
comparative framework. Needless to say, historical processes are 
heterogeneous, complex, contentious, power-driven, profit-driven, individually-
driven involving particular actors with particular political and economic motive 
drivers or not, and the role of the mass media, popular psychologists, 
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commentators, academics, civil societies intercept with the making of what 
become politics of the modern nation-state. This cannot be replaced with a 
simplified picture of cultural determinism in a generalised comparative 
framework.
Benedict did, however, also provide some insightful comments such as “State 
Shinto in the schools becomes the history of Japan” which indicate she did 
understand the ideological drive to re-create Japanese history. Yet, the 
ambivalent obsession with patterns takes the newly-established emperor system 
legitimised by an invented tradition of a modernised version of the ethic of the 
old bushi, or samurai class to be representative of the Japanese. Taking the 
national ideology and calling it culture, she presents it as something natural. A 
more thoroughly historical analysis only becomes prevalent in Japanese studies 
much later in the 1990s where Benedict’s text and the huge influence of theories 
of ‘culture’ begins to unravel. ‘Japanese society’ as the harmonious and stable, 
free of social conflict turn out to be an ideology of homogeneity. As the 
‘reinvented’ tradition becomes explanation for economic growth and Japanese 
economic super-power status in the 1980s (see Goodman 2005), it neglects the 
considerable diversity by region, gender, occupation, ethnic identity, social class 
and the considerable stratification going on that is currently a more accurate 
picture of Japan. 
What do we then do when we know that ‘Culture’ as an analytical category is not 
a given as otherwise so eloquently portrayed by Benedict but rather a socially 
constructed cultural identity - manipulated, assimilated, and transformed by 
certain groups with economic and political power to do so. Any substantial and 
meaningful comparative cultural analysis must include such a distinction 
between ideology and practice, and recognise the active (state) propaganda, in 
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the case of Japan was found to present an active collusion between the 
government, leading publishing companies such a s Iwanami Shoten and 
Kodansha Shupansha, and leading academics from top universities to present 
majority Japanese culture (Garon 1997). The constructed-ness of ethnic identity 
for the purpose of creating common links, naturalness and legitimacy of 
particular values and beliefs help to make fewer people both inside and outside 
of Japan think deeply about understanding the origins of shared symbols, rituals 
and histories. This constructed instrumentality that for some time becomes lived 
as ‘primordial’ and ‘natural’ is an example of a prominent essentialist picture that 
uses ‘culture’ in an ahistorical comparative framework with considerable 
historical effects. The obsession with answering ‘who are the Japanese’ 
dominated the study of Japan in the 1980s as it rose to economic superpower and 
Nakasone Yasuhiro established the generously funded International Research 
Center for Japanese Studies known as Nichibunken in Kyoto to look at the 
origins and development of what constituted Japanese culture. Notable Ross 
Mouer and Harumi Befu investigated this genre as actually contributing to the 
mystification of theories of the Japanese people rather than simply being a 
reflection of their lives. Needless to say, the interception between academic 
knowledge, power and history makes any comparison infinitely complex.
Comparison between representations of Self and Other
Yet, comparing ourselves to a perceived and constructed idea of the ‘Other’ is an 
intrinsic part of our social existence, and intertwine with what makes our own 
perception and constructions of ‘Self’ on many different levels. In this way, we 
may learn something about ourselves by studying other societies, where 
completely different conventions prevail and make for common sense. However, 
in comparative texts in Japan, ‘Japan’ and the ‘West’ were often juxtaposed as 
monolithic categories that entailed an extremely binary model for comparison. 
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Taken here from Roger Goodman (2005: 65) and his argument about creating 
‘majority culture’ , this could be summarised as a typology of opposites between 
supposedly “Japanese” and “Western” inherent characteristics: 
  
1. RACIAL HETEROGENEITY (jinshu no konketsu 人種の混血 ) vs RACIAL 
HOMOGENIETY (tan’itsu minzoku 単一民族 )
2. COMPETITIVE CONFLICT (meiwaku 迷惑 ) vs. HARMONY (wa 和 )
3. INDIVIDUALISM (kojinshugi 個人主義 ) vs. GROUPISM (shūdanshugi 集団
主義 )
4. EGALITARIAN, HORIZONTAL TIES (yoko 横 ) vs. VERTICAL, 
HIERARCHICAL TIES (tate 縦 )
5. UNIVERSAL ETHICS (kochokuteki genre 子 直 的 原 理 ) vs. 
PARTICULARISTIC ETHICS 
(jōkyō ronri 状況論理 )
6. SENSE OF RIGHT (kenri 権利 ) vs. SENSE OF DUTY (gimu 義務 )
7. LOGICAL/RATIONAL (gōriteki 合理的 ) vs. AMBIVALENT/EMOTIONAL 
(kanjōteki 感情的 )
8. INDEPENDENCE (dokuritsu 独立 ) vs. DEPENDENCE (amae 甘え )
9. CONTRACTUALISM (keiyaku 契約 ) vs. “KINTRACTUALISM” (en’yaku 遠約
) 
Here ‘Japan’ is most basically constituted as if it presented a sociality of non-
dualism, while simultaneously the very framework of the analysis of ‘Japan’ and 
‘the West’ is a cosmology steeped in dualism and oppositions, usually for 
comparison of cultural superiority. While dualistic thinking has been prominent 
on many levels in particular in modern medicine, ‘the West’ is an incoherent 
category for analysis. Jacque Derrida is credited for one of the most eloquent 
demonstrations of what later came to be called ‘deconstruction’, for it breaks 
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Western metaphysics open and simultaneously point away from dualistic meta-
narratives. However, similar challenges were part and parcel in the very 
foundation of sociology. Equally in the West, as in Japan, ‘Western social 
thought’ has often been often used as a ‘strawman’ against which to juxtapose 
one’ s position. 
The ‘West’, just as ‘Japan’, is hardly a monolithic entity of thought, both contain 
rich and diverse philosophical traditions. There are many Western thinkers who 
have questioned the intrinsic Cartesian mind-body dualism that often is seen as 
representative of the West. In fact, arguments against dualistic thinking between 
self and society, between mind and body, between objectivity and subjectivity 
were a central part of the institutionalisation of the social sciences in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century as indicated in my reference to Max Weber. A 
critical discussion of the unfeasibility of objectivity as a zero-sum possibillity 
regarded still as fairly achievable in the natural sciences (of course 
fundamentally questioned early on by David Hume (1711-1776) was fundational 
to social inquiry in the German intellectual tradition by figures such as Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1833-1911), Max Weber (1864-1920) and Georg Simmel (1858-1918). 
Objectivity as a condition outside history was regarded as an implausible 
analytical framework since meaning and complex motivations are central to 
human experience, that is always other-oriented and instrumental in action and 
always is in a historical context. They poignantly challenged a non-historical 
account of ideas which they saw as a falsely constructed objective-subjective 
dualism not applicable to understanding human actions. Foundational to social 
inquiry is how we come to think of the ‘modern’ era, many of the ideas such as 
reason, secularism, science, empiricism, progress, toleration, and the idea of the 
human as bounded and equal go on to become and still are foundational to the 
twenty and twenty first centuries but were always systematically challenged as 
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not something to be taken at face-value, or in a positivistic manner. These 
debates came out of reactions to colonialism, the institutionalisation of racism 
and eruption of nationalism that were part of the wider historical period of the 
rise and ending of the Atlantic slave system, the making and breaking of 
European global empires, the industrial and urban revolutions, the rise of 
fascism and communism, racism and pogroms, the formal decolonization of the 
Americas, Asia, and Africa and so on. Social theorists indeed often did formulate 
their attempts to address these momentous processes and events in terms of 
(more or less strong) antinomies (real or apparent inherent mutual 
incompatibility), dichotomies (division or contrast between two things 
represented as being opposed or entirely different), or simple oppositions. Many 
of these indeed have been highly durable and productive in social thought in the 
West but also in the East. 
Enduring dualisms (such as primitive-civilised, traditional-modern, male-female, 
mind-body, nature-culture, science-history) indeed expressed in most social 
inquiry provided options for defining 1) the object of social inquiry, 2) the 
method used to study that object, and 3) the kind and direction of social change 
societies were thought to be undergoing. Dualisms were often seen as grounded 
in the nature of an external reality as expressed by Durkheim, or else in the 
structure of the human intellect or emotions (Levi-Straus), and their attraction as 
a way of thinking indeed continues to proliferate in the social sciences but so 
equally in the East as in the West. This is probably because of the way in which 
dualisms bring sufficient order to formulate questions that would otherwise be 
difficult ‘to think’. Oppositions are highly productive in this sense, but as 
discussed using the case of Benedict’s comparative cultural binaries, we need to 
think through how such oppositions are used to construct knowledge about the 
social world, to what extent are we creating overly generalised models of the 
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world in comparing East and West (see Hendry and Wong 2006). 
 
Though dualism may appear as either/or choices – and some thinkers have 
plumped strongly for one side or the other – the real issue in specific situations 
is often how to combine apparent opposites without logical contradiction within 
different context that may at first sight appear different but also be substantially 
similar. Should one try to achieve the best balance or trade-off between them, or 
is it possible to argue that one side of an opposition applies in some contexts, and 
the other side in others (when, for instance, people are both ‘reasonable’ and 
moved by ‘passions’ depending on the circumstances, or are both rational and 
irrational in their rationalization of their actions as was the thesis of Weber). 
Furthermore, what ideas mean in a given context is not set. A general idea in 
context can turn into something very different depending on the actor and the 
situation.
The idea of a predominant ‘Western’ dualistic view of the world has thus also 
been seen as highly questionable within the Western world itself, while 
continued to be undoubtedly dominant in sciences such as medicine, and still 
dominant in quantitative studies. I will discuss a few examples from these 
debates below to illustrate the difficulty of constructing the idea of one ‘Western’ 
mode of reasoning as there are equally those who directly oppose the dualisms 
of self/other, objective/subjective and mind/body as dualistic categories. My 
point here is that the stereotypical image of an unquestioned dualistic Western 
culture often still perceived as such in some comparative frameworks used to 
construct the idea of for example ‘Asian’ values as necessarily more wholistic or 
non-dualistic. While some general trends in ideal thought, values and 
philosophies are certainly possible to trace that could pertain to “Asian” or 
“Western” we have to tread carefully as social scientists who are attempting 
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understand the empirical reality of people’s lives rather than ideal representions 
of them. Finding overlaps, similarities amidst apparent difference may offer 
equally enlightened insight into the human condition. 
Some brief thoughts on challenges to dualistic thinking in the West from 
within.
A contemporary of Durkheim, John Dewey (1859-1852) in particular could be 
seen as challenging a dualistic view of life pertaining it to be a false premise upon 
which science was seeking supposedly objective knowledge. He made such 
critique the mainstay of his social philosophy and continues to be an important 
thinker today. Dewey attempted to undermine all forms of dualisms - between 
theory and practice, between intellect and emotions, between empirical and 
rational knowledge, between mind and body, between facts and values. As part 
of American Pragmatist thought, he challenged the idea that objective scientific 
facts were possibly to the extent that objectivity and subjectivity were two 
different realms outside context and the design of the actors involved. Instead, 
Dewey saw a close parallel between what was being promoted as scientific truth 
and the ideas and beliefs held by the scientist. While this view may be accepted 
today by many social scientists, and taken for granted by many anthropologists, 
it still remains much less enacted in practice where categorisation derived from 
such a basis still prevail. Seeing ‘facts’ as objectified representations of an always 
far more complex reality that is essentially unstable remain a constant challenge 
to any academic undertaking, let alone a comparative framework. 
Furthermore, our theories about other people intercept with theories about 
ourselves and cannot easily be divested of their conceptual shaping. We cannot 
be spectators separate from the world, outside our cultural and historical 
context. Although we can reflect upon our ‘situated-ness’ to a large degree, we 
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will remain agents, individuals within a historical context. This includes the 
scientist who base their acts equally upon their theories about the world. For 
‘pragmatist philosophy’ objects, people, ideas were always seen as derived from a 
standpoint of an agent. Dewey, rather radically, refused to start from the 
premise, still dominant in many fields today, that one can distinguish between 
the subject who is studying and the object under study. 
If we accept the premise that human thought is essentially social in origin, that 
the perspective of ‘objectivity’ itself has a social origin, and that thoughts occur 
only in specific cultural contexts – the ‘why things came to be in this way’, 
however ‘natural’ they may appear swept in language such as ‘traditional culture’ 
– sets up the humanist science as a discipline that does not attempt to separate 
mind and matter to try to reflect reality. In this way, as the prominent German 
thinker Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) argued more than a century ago, 
knowledge and experience are not different things. Knowledge arises equally 
out of experience, the only difference between experience and knowledge is that 
experience is unreflective, while knowledge is experience reflected upon and 
theorised about. This premise that challenges the most fundamental dualism of 
body and mind was central to Dilthey’s thinking that influenced American 
Pragmatism. Representation (Vorstellung) on the other hand implies the subject-
object distinction. Dilthey identifies the ‘objectifications of life’ as the central 
body of facts (Literally ‘things made’), which tell us about life and about 
ourselves  . . . through examinations of the products of human life and activity in 
the form of objectifications’, Verstehen in this sense ‘refers to the understanding 
of spiritual or mental reality’ objectified through cultural systems’. Dilthey made 
much of Verstehen as the ‘cement that make the world of human affairs cohere: 
‘Verstehen is a rediscovery of the I in the thou’ .’ 1 Discovering ‘myself’ in ‘you’ 
1　 Quoted in Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction, p.24 by Ramon J. Betanzos.
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may arguably be, a central component in a comparative framework and what 
makes it worthwhile.
So, if knowledge is an intellectual grasp of a situation, which every day 
experience may lack (ibid.), the academic authority based on the object-subject 
dualism inherent in many science projects were radically challenged early on in 
the formation of the discipline of sociology. In Democracy and Education 
Dewey lists a wealth of dualisms, but in particular the mind-body dualism, 
indeed pervasive in Western (and other) thought, arguing here that throughout 
Western traditions, knowledge has been seen as contemplative exercise that 
existed for its own sake, as separate and independent from practical interests. Of 
course, philosophy certainly has set up a long history of practical activities as 
inferior to the “higher” realms of ideas, Dewey argued that such body-mind 
dualism always entails a hierarchical relationship that look to the practical and 
the philosophical as two separate entities. He argued that this was the result of a 
ruling and non-working aristocracy that characterised the old class structures of 
Greek society where such ideas were first discussed. This social organisation of 
course and the hierarchies involved in the division between physical and mental 
activities has been almost a universal phenomenon and certainly entrenched in 
most societal organisation today. Dewey saw Christianity as the epitome of the 
mind-body split with its full-fledged antithesis between spirit and matter. We 
could of course think of many similar examples in the “East” or in Japan such as 
the widespread belief in or veneration of the spirit of one’ s ancestors. In short, 
the idea of mind-body dualism, indeed prominent in much scientific and 
religious and Western philosophy was also challenged as fundamentally an 
outcome of the class and status divisions within society in socalled “Western” 
societies including America. For Dewey, the perception of dualism only existed 
in the process of interpreting the world, in reality there is no dualism but only 
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our perception of it in line with the reification of ‘mental’ work above ‘physical’ 
work. It is easy to see how this division of labour is not an exclusive “Western” 
dualism. This points to just one simple but fundamental difficulty of making the 
mind-body dualism and the various forms of this a particularly “Western” 
phenomenon as if by default of stating this, we can then idealise a supposedly 
non-dualistic “East”.  A more interesting and historically accurate investigation 
could be to compare what specific thinking in the East and in the West that both 
challenged the wider tendency to dualistic thinking that is so pervasive on many 
levels of life whichever region we may refer.
In line with such challenges to the mind-body dualism, those who were 
influenced by American Pragmatism were not concerned only with accumulating 
knowledge, but with affecting social reform and changing institutional practices 
as they applied their ideas to work. The focus was on social activity seen to be 
undertaken by a conscious individual who had feelings and emotions; individuals 
who were perceived to have a purpose and objective in life. Still academia in the 
social sciences, also as they were instituted in Japan and elsewhere, tended to 
simplify human experience and objectify human cultural practices into 
generalised, easily comprehendible models for explaining social phenomena and 
the people involved. In short, ‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’ practices are overdrawn 
dualistic categories that stabilise and overgeneralise a much more complex 
reality. 
So can we think about comparing cultures and societies, let alone national 
cultures and societies?
Today, it has become increasingly difficult to talk about societies or cultures in a 
way that suggest stable and concrete entities with well-defined boundaries and 
norms that can be classified according to an overarching social structure, or 
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national psychology. Furthermore, a constructed national culture such as 
“Japanese culture” that can, as Morris-Suzuki argues, not simply be rectified by 
placing alongside the mainstream culture, ‘minorities’ so far excluded without 
recognising that a lot of differences exist within these broad categories, and that 
the very notion of “minority” is itself constructed in relation to creating a 
“majority culture” (1998:208-209; cf. Goodman 2005)2 such as the widespread 
belief in or veneration of the spirit of one’ s ancestors. Previous way to think 
about cultures or societies in terms of a binary structure of the individual vis-à-vis 
society assumed extreme group homogeneity, which is a position that has 
proven untenable. 
Furthermore, there are none of the ideal small and homogenous societies, 
untouched by the outside that was the imagined object of inquiry for the early 
anthropologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was a 
time when Western countries such as Britain, America, Spain, France and 
Holland had colonised major parts of the world. In the fear of a vanishing 
subject, anthropology mostly pursued their study with such a perspective of one 
cultural phenomenon supposedly unspoilt by the avenges of modernity. 
Assuming peoples to have lived primarily in separate, largely non-mobile 
communities instead of a reality of migration, movement and exchange was at 
best an inadequate ‘stabilisation’ of knowledge, and at worst that of the colonial 
project itself. Human cultures and societies are less homogenous in nature and 
more open to the outside world. Yet, generally assumed broad categories still 
play central parts of the popular imagination as forms of explanation of others 
that serves as a synecdoche, a type of metonym where the parts stand for the 
whole. That is, many assumed relationships and characteristics easily come 
2　See also Hankins (2012) who discusses the implications of multiculturalism and ethnic 
identity as ways of managing difference.
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under such broad headings as ‘The Japanese’, ‘The Chinese’, ‘The Ainu’, ‘The 
British’ despite cultures or peoples being quite undefinable as such objects as 
part of processes of continuous exchange and transformation, and the politics of 
the nation-state, as well as individual circumstances. 
If we take this to be the case, what can we then refer to when we talk about 
‘cultures’ given the reality of diffusion, fluidity and extreme fragmentation? How 
can we think carefully enough about history and specific contexts, and include 
prominently the politics of the nation-state that are deeply intertwined with any 
group categorisation of ‘difference’ in today’s world? If any kind of comparative 
potential is to be possible, understanding clearly what our ‘investigative 
groundwork’ will need to be is a first step to substantiate our representations of 
people’s beliefs and behaviour, what we may loosely refer to as ‘cultures’, their 
embodies logics and attitudes which have long been part of processes of 
migration and politics, and complicated further by the intensifying globalised 
context of today and the world wide web. Marketing politics such as filters that 
give internet users what they are analysed to want may have the effect of 
polarising populations and eroding the legitimacy of democratic institutions as is 
visible everywhere today. The ‘filter bubbles’ made possible with new 
smartphone technology has enabled the creation of digital realities where 
existing beliefs easily become more rigid and extreme in differentiating oneself 
from imagined others as part of fuelling new forms of nationalism.
Much has been said about the nation as an imagined concept of belonging that 
carries deep contradictions, paradoxes and even incoherence. Imaginings of 
belonging to the nation is imbued with processes of transcendence and 
sacredness, not incomparable necessarily with how we might think about 
‘religion’, a state -of effervescent that transcends the individual and gives rise to 
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the sense of being part of something bigger. Paradoxically, that “bigger” today 
may be often fuelled by particular bubbles of false information. Emile Durkheim 
of course famously sees religion as such transcendence, the projection of a 
society’s ideals onto something external, making the imaginings of belonging to a 
moral community the transcendence of the individual and what may constitute a 
religious experience. However the particular way the nation is imagined and the 
universality of nationality with it being simultaneously a particular socio-cultural 
conceptual construct lead us to question any easy representation of the nation. 
Despite the popularity of doing so, is it ever possible to talk about a national 
culture? The nation as an object still carries potent political force however 
fragmented the imagination about it may become. Nationalism carries much 
potency for political mobilization and is again on the rise worldwide as part of the 
‘anti-politics’ and anti-establishment forces, often created in internet bubbles of 
“facts” . So, while we may argue that nationalism presents a kind of empty 
philosophical system, even a kind of unintelligibility, because of the distance 
from reality it presents, it is also very real as a political driving force in many 
societies today. Nationalism has this emptiness at the centre that easily stir the 
condescension of others, and constructs clear ‘us’ and ‘them’ binaries that can, as 
it did in the past, create terrible effects. Perhaps it is worth reiterating why did 
Perhaps it is worth reiterating why Anderson (ibid.) called it ‘imagined’, rather 
than simply ‘false’ ? 
False would indicate that there also is a true world, while in fact it is imagined 
because even in the smallest of nations no one ever meets all their fellow 
members, or even hear of them. Simultaneously in the minds of each person 
who imagines they belong to the nation lives the image of their communion, as if 
they belong together often at the exclusion of others. However much we may 
disagree with nationalism’s imagined community, its narrow conceptualisation 
Comparing Cultures and Societies : the anthropological quest to understand the diversity and the universals of life （ 69 ）
and exclusive nature, the power of this imagining cannot simply be dismissed as 
a false invention. What we can do is consider the imagining from its historical 
productivity, just as was the case with Benedict’s representation of Japan’ s 
national culture. However, “false” this way of thinking was immensely 
productive. Moving beyond a true/false binary critique means to dismantle our 
ideal community as the standard by which to judge how things ought to be, 
which tend to distort rather than seek to understand the reality for people. 
Academically, focusing on this history will give us a better understanding of how 
people experience the world even if we disagree with them, and even if we are 
dealing with ‘brain hacking’ as Google design ethicist Tristan Harris calls people 
who have become impervious to new ideas including demonstrable facts.
As the ‘grand Enlightenment narratives’ as standard of judgement have gone and 
we face new serious challenges surrounding questions of authority of 
knowledge, revisiting (heuristically) some of the debates about the tensions 
between history and science may serve us well to rekindle the arguments about 
the belief in the possibility of objectivity in social inquiry. As “objectivity” turned 
out at almost every corner to be more precisely ethnocentrism, we may want to 
reconsider some of the earlier challenges to this notion of objectivity, as a 
monolithic state and what it may mean in today’ s world. Exploring objectivity as a 
form of value-judgement was fundamental to social inquiry by founders of 
sociology such as Max Weber (1864-1920). Weber and later John Dewey (1859-
1952) as a proponent of American Pragmatism saw “truth” and knowledge as 
context- and subject-bound rather than a scientific possibility without any actors 
involved. Both questioned early dominant binary ideas such as objectivity versus 
subjectivity, or the mind-body dualism as already pointed out, and also showed 
how constructions of Self and Society are intertwined rather than separate 
phenomena. Significantly, Weber used the methodology of looking at historical 
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constellations of meaning and the way capitalism is a value-system that equated 
hard work and the accumulation of money with being morally worthy and as 
giving meaning to life. This way of looking at a new economic rationale we now 
refer to loosely as ‘capitalism’ moved beyond the idea that economic 
determinism can ever explain fully our rapidly changing world. Seeing people as 
determined solely by external structures without considering people as complex 
beings who do not possess simply one singular consciousness, motivation or 
circumstance and are always concerned with a sense of self-worth, meaning and 
purpose. Yet, deterministic explanations for people’s behaviour, grouped into 
culture and society as “objectified culture” became highly influential as already 
discussed. As we trace historical trajectories about fundamental concepts used in 
the social sciences as part of a more substantial comparative framework we also 
come to understand the constructions of our “modern” sensibilities of the new 
ways of how we view ourselves and others. A historical focus will need to include 
exploring relations of power in relation to the construction of the nation-state, 
industrialisation, the intertwinement of universal education systems, religious 
practices, the role of the mass media, governance, politics, the nature of publics, 
and much more, including the whole new arena of the internet and social media. 
The different ways and different levels (micro/macro/interactive/abstract level 
for instance) at which we look at overarching concept “society” led thinkers such 
as Max Weber and Georg Simmel (1858-1918) to question early on the most 
taken for granted notion of society as a kind of sum total of institutions, 
traditions, law and language within a defined area. Most of us commonly think 
about society or the Other (the West, the Americans, the East etc.) in similar 
ways where we make the mistake of generalising far too much. This usually 
happens when we constitute the Other in a particular way to indicate how 
different they supposedly are from us (such as the typology of Nihonjinron 
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referred to earlier), rather than also investigating similarities and the many 
overlaps that exist between two extreme ends. 
Needless to say, as pointed out in this article, thinking through the feasibility of 
the terms we use such as ‘society’ or ‘culture’ we continue to run into problems 
of overgeneralisation and many debates about maintaining or dismissing the 
concepts have been had. Looking at ideas within their historical contexts to try 
to avoid importantly both the fallacy of ‘presentism’, that is to introduce present 
day ideas and perspectives onto depictions and interpretations of the past, as well 
as reinventing the academic wheel by forgetting old academic debates already 
had. We easily miss what particular people actually meant and how people 
experienced the world differently even if they used the same vocabulary. Or 
indeed had similar experiences but used very different vocabulary. Thus 
historical context and place are important if we are to move beyond a superficial 
and often misleading comparison between the past and the present, between 
different places, and between different peoples. Understanding context, meaning 
and people’s attitudes are vitally important if we aim to achieve more than a 
superficial comparative framework between different groups of people. In the 
end, however, we may also find we have a lot more in common than anticipated.
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